Introduction
• Outline Model • Explore commitment policy and its inherent time inconsistency.
• Contrast with discretionary solution.
• An example computing the credibility of commitment policy.
• Conclusions
Closed economy model
• Infinitely lived, representative consumer
• Supplies labour to imperfectly competitive firms subject to Calvo contracts, giving a NKPC:
• Marginal cost from labour supply (labour income taxed)
• Intertemporal allocation of consumption is influenced by monetary policy in presence of sticky prices,
• Government provides public goods, financed through distortionary labour income taxes, and satisfies intertemporal budget constraint,
• Monetary policy affects debt service costs too.
Welfare derivations
• Focus is on distortion caused by nominal inertia and debt stabilisation.
• Abstract from monopolistic competition and steady state tax distortions using output subsidy that achieves efficient equilibrium in steady state • Lump-sum tax to finance subsidy in initial steady state only. Outside of this steady state, taxes are distortionary.
• Assume throughout that monetary and fiscal policy are determined co-operatively Social Welfare
• Derived from second order Taylor expansion of utility of representative agent.
•'^' denotes log deviation from steady-state.
•'*' denotes efficient level of variable.
•tip=terms independent of policy.
•O[2]=terms greater than order 2.
Monetary policy and shocks
• If nominal inertia only occurs in price setting, then in the absence of debt, monetary policy can achieve the efficient allocation in the face of taste and technology shocks .
• If we add taxes as a fiscal instrument, then these can be used to offset cost-push shocks too (we define the tax gap as net of these shocks).
• So, in this model, welfare costs only arise because of the presence of debt, and the absence of lump sum taxes for debt stabilisation purposes.
Optimal policy under commitment
• The variable f captures the impact of shocks
Some first order conditions (s>0)
• For s>0, inflation is zero. Can show all other variables (y, g and c) are functions of debt LM, which is constant such that y, g and c fall, while taxes (typically) rise in the new steady-state.
• Implies debt does not return to steady state, but instead follows a random walk
Intuition behind random walk result
• Welfare involves inflation, gaps in output, consumption and public spending, and taxes are distortionary. Welfare does not depend directly on debt.
• Random walk debt implies permanent changes in spending and taxes to finance change in debt, but these costs are discounted.
• The alternative of returning debt to its original level involves short term, but much larger, changes in taxes and spending, and these will impact on output and inflation, even with optimal monetary policy Commitment policy: time inconsistency
•Initial term in each expression defines difference between initial and subsequent periods.
Commitment policy: time inconsistency
• Steady state debt under commitment policy is given by (where Ψ is a complex combination of parameters)
•RHS is full accommodation. So policy does make some attempt to reduce debt in the initial period. This is true even if debt is real.
Debt Shocks Under Commitment and Discretion and raises taxes in the first period by a small amount, which raises inflation, but because expectations are given, there is no knock on impact on future inflation.
• If govt re-optimises each period, then economic agents will form expectations recognising the incentive to introduce policy surprises to stabilise debt, such that govt is forced to implement a policy free from surprises.
• This 'debt stabilisation bias' is only removed once debt has returned to its original (efficient) level. 
